Processes affecting "understanding of others" and "assumed similarity." report No. 10 by Cronbach, Lee J.
ililiiti
L I B R.ARY
OF THL
U N 1 VLRSITY
or ILLl NOIS
370
The person charging this material is re-
sponsible for its return on or before the
Latest Date stamped below.
Theft, mutilation and underlining of books
are reasons for disciplinary action and may
result in dismissal from the University.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Di:C :\r. 13'
L161—O-1096
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/processesaffecti10cron


no. lO
GROUP EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH LABORATORY
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois
PROCESSES AFFECTING "UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS"
AND "ASSUMED SIMILARITY"
LEE J. CRONBACH
College of Education, University of Illinois
TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 10
Study performed under Contract N6-ori-07135
with the Office of Naval Research
PROJECT ON
SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND GROUP EFFECTIVENESS
AUGUST, 1954
THE LIBRARY OF thf
SEP 27 1954
UNIVERSITY OF lUINOIS

PROCESSES AFFECTING SCORI]S OH "Ul€)ERSTi.l\IDING OF OTHFRS"
AND "ASSUIED SBCLi^-RITY"-''
Lee J» Cronbach
College of Education, University of Illinois
How one person judges another is important both for its theo-
retical implications and for its practical significance in leadership,
clinical assessment, and teaching skill. Recent studies of "social per-
ception", as this area is termed, have been chiefly concerned with dif-
ferences among perceivers, either in terms of their accuracy, or in terms
of their tendency to view others as similar to themselves.
These studies have usually been built aroimd a particiilar operation
in which a judge (J) "predicts" hoi^ another person (o) will respond.
Often, for example, both persons describe themselves on a personality
inventory, and J is then asked to fill out the inventory as he thinks
did. The extent to which the prediction agrees with 0*s actual response
is talcen as a measure of J's accuracy of social perception (or "empathy",
"social sensitivity", or "diagnostic competence", etc). Measurements
obtained in this manner are difficult to interpret and several investi-
gators have obtained evidence of distressingly low reliability or con-
sistency for such scores (11,17,19,28).
This paper seeks to disentangle some of the many effects xjhich
contribute to social perception scores, and to identify separately meas-
urable coniponents. This analysis has several results:
"* Appreciation is expressed to Mary E. Ehart, who assisted in all
stages of this paper from initial conception to final interpretation;
and to Urie Bronfenbrenner and associates, for helpfully providing data
and for their courtesy in exchanging ideas throughout our rather similar
inve stigations ,
This study was conducted under 01© Contract N6-ori-07135s Fred E,
Fiedler, Principal Investigator,

1# It shows that investigators run much risk
of giving psychological interpretation to
mathematical artifacts, when measures are
used which combine the components,
2, It sheds light on the extent to which adapta-
tion to individual differences is advisable,
when the differences are not judged accurately,
3. It directs attention to some especially inter-
esting aspects of social perception left untouched
by the usual approach.
Our analysis of social perception scores may also be
instructive regarding research strategy generally. This area of
research has developed in an ultra-operationalist manner^ of late,
workers have seemed content to regard "empati^" as "what empathy
tests measure". The principal research activity has been corre-
lating "empathy", so defined, with other variables, ;/e shall
show, however, that the operation involves many unsuspected
sources of variation, so that scores are impure and results un-
interpretable. Studies based on myopic operationism are largely
waste effort, x^rhen the operation does not correspond to potentially
meaningful constructs. Defining a measure operationally is only
a first stage, preliminary to analytic studies which can refine the
measure and bring it closer to the intended construct. It ms^ be
of interest to note that this paper relies alir.ost entirely on al-
gebraic analysis as its research method. Even though analysis is
based on a model rather than actual behavior, it generates severrl
psychological hypotheses.

Although our report deals with a specialized area of per-
ceptual research, it shares much of the perspective of Postman*
s
important general revievj of perception (21;), His remarks are
peculiarly pertinent to studies of social perception, even thougji
he was referring especially to the "New Look" studies of perception
of words and objects:
"At this juncture of debate, we shall do xiell to pull up
short a moment and reconsider the fundamental operations of our
perceptual experiments, particularly as they bear on the validity
of the theoretical constructs linking perception to motivation and
personality*..Experiments have shared a common tendency vdiich may
be called the projective bias a selective emphasis on central
motivational determinants at the expense of adequate attention to
the verbal and motor response dispositions of the subject and the
relation of these dispositions to the dimensions of the stimulus.,..
We must, then reaffirm the critical importance of a full and precise
analysis of the responses as well as the stimuli which furnish the
basic data of perceptual experiments,"
A Mathematical Resolution of Social
Perception Scores into Components
Model and notation
When data are gathered by means of a test consisting of
items (i = a, b, c, ••• k), these items define a k-dimensional
space, and the responses of any person define a point in that
space (10), One point is defined by O's actual responses, and
another ty J*s prediction for 0, x^^ denotes the response given
by Other (O) when describing himself on item i, VJhen a judge (j)
predicts what will say, x-ie have a prediction, Jq^a . x is
alw^s used to indicate self-descriptions, y to indicate pre-
dictions.
Error in prediction is represented hj the discrepancy between
Xqj|_ and yoiT* I^ some studies J*s accuracy is measiored by summing

ly .. - X .1. \/e shall instead measure accuracy by the distance
from the predicted to the actual location in k-space, as determined
by the sum over items of squared differences. This formula is easier
to treat mathematically than the sum of absolute differences^ and
will ordinarily give about the same results, tJhen all items are of
a Yes - No form, so that the error on any prediction can only be
1 or 0, the two formulas give identical results. Our measure has
the important property of being invariant under orthogonal rotation
of axes (10),
We define the Accuracy with vjhich J perceives ty
ACC^
.
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Either ACC or ACC msy be used as a measure. Because it is much
easier to analyze ACC^ than ACC, we treat ACC^ throughout this paper.
This should be reiaembered in applying results.
Now we define
Grand mean of aH
self-description re-
sponses; average ele-
vation) •
Mean of all persons
on any item
Mean of argr person on
all items; his elevation
We define y 9 7 - and y correspondingly. Then x . - x
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would be the mean score on an item, figured as a deviation from the
overall mean, x - x is a score on the item, figured as a devia-
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tion from the item mean. We shall let x' . stand for x - x01 oi o,
X . + X , and define y' . similarly. These are scores figured
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as deviations from both nt^m and pp^rson mean, i »<=;., "ceiitRi-orl on
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The Accuracy Score and Its Components
j^cciiracy in predicting one on one item may be measured
simply by the absolute value of the error. We have the folloTO.ng
identity:
ACC
..»i y..-x.l» j (y .-x )
* iij^ . -y
i
) - ( ^ - X ))
O.J ..J 0» *•
+ (( y .. - y . ) - ( X -. X ))
•ij
..J •j-j ••
+ ( y» .. - x» . )!! (2)
^ ^ oij 01 ^' ^ '
In the right member of (2), the first term compares the
elevation of J*s (the Judge's) predictions to the average elevation
of the criterion responses. Each person using a scale forms his
own frame of reference, and some people tend to use different
portions of the scale than others (?)• This first term -will be
small if J uses about the same part of the scale as the average 0,
The second term represents J's ability to predict the relative
elevation of the particular 0, It measures J<s knowledge of this
0*s mode of response on the scale.
The third term is, like the first, independent of the
particular 0, It represents J's error in estimating the
relative difficulty or popularity of the item.
The fourth component represents accuracy of prediction for
the individual Other, after we remove the first three differences.
It expresses J's knoxjledge of the shape and scatter of O's profale
of deviation scores.
' '! ;>
•
liJ ..
6Host research has been concerned with the accuracy of J as
a judge of all Others, This coiiLd be represented by an average of
his accuracy scores (ACC
.
) with particular Others,
ACC^ = i 2 ACC^ = k ( f - 2r )^
J N o oj ..j ••
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..J o» ••
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These four terms are attributable respectively to the dif-
ference of J's elevation from the average, his errors in predict-
ing individual deviations in elevation, errors in predicting item
means, and errors in predicting individual deviations from the
item mean (after correction for elevation). We shall refer to
these as the Elevation (E) component, the Differential Elevation (DE)
component , the Stereotype Accuracy (SA) component , and the Differ-
ential Accuracy (DA) component. The last three of these require
separate discussion.
Differential Elevation QJE)
The Differential Elevation component measiires J's errors
in judging the "elevation" of O's responses. In some tests ele-
vation reflects insignificant response sets, and we should ignore
this component (cf. 10, p, k^3)» In other tests this component
reflects J»s judgment of the overall "desirability" of each 0, and
if so, it may be very important.

The Differential Elevation component may be broken down by-
using the formula for sioms of squares of correlated differences:
2 2 2
DE = k ( a- + a- - 2o- a- r- • ) {k)
•^O.J O. O.J o« o. -^cj
2
The variance o- measures J*s tendency to predict that Others
differ in elevation. It represents Assumed Dispersion in Ele-
vation, later seen to be a component of "Assumed Similarity".
2
o- is the true dispersion in elevation. The correlation r-
^o. ^o* ^o.j
(to be symbolized DEr) represents J»s ability to judge which 0*s
rate highest on the elevation scale. If every item measures morale,
for instance, the correlation shows how well J can judge which O's
say they have the highest morale.
Stereotype Accuracy (SA)
As used here "stereotype accuracy" refers to the person^s
ability to predict the norm for Others, It might be called
"accuracy in predicting the generalized other" (3). This score
depends on J*s knovjledge of the relative frequency or popularity
of the possible responses. In contrast to our stereotype inferred
from responses on many items. Gage measures an explicit stereotype.
He asks J»s to predict the model response among Others of a
specified type (l6, p, 8-11), Similar stereotype predictions are
obtained in studies of ability to estimate group opinion (e.g.,
6, 18, 29). Evidence comparing these two types of stereotype,
would be valuable.
We may write;
SA^ = k ( a^ + oS - 2 a- a- r- - ) {$)
a y.. y. ^ n^ ± ^ ±-\^ ±
Here each variance is computed over items. The variance a«
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expresses hcu much J expects item means to vary, o- is the
X
2 'O
scatter of the actual means, SA represents ability to judge the
shape and scatter of the profile of item means, r- - (Stereotype
y.ij ^.i
Correlation, SAr) represents accuracy in judging mean profile shape
without regard to errors in judging profile scatter (i,e,, spread
in difficulty).
Differential Accuracy (DA)
Differential Accuracy measures ability to predict differences
between persons on any item. This component is a sum over items.
The component for ar^ item brealcs down:
(6)
2 2 2
DA = a + a •-2a a r
ij y' x» y' xi y» X
oij oi oij oi oij oi
2 2
DA , summed over items, yields DA • Each variance in the formula
ij J
is taken over Others, a
,
is the Assumed Dispersion on the item
(see below). It resembles closely Gage^s concept of "rigidity" or
"adherence to stereotype" in prediction (l5, p. l6j 17 )•
The correlation (DAr) in (6) is a measure of ability to judge
which Others have highest scores on the item, when the score is
taken as a deviation from the Others* mean. There is one such
correlation for each item.
Implications
Seven aspects of J*s performance have been separated:
1, Elevation component: difference of predicted
average response from actual average
2, Assumed Dispersion in Elevation "\
} Differential
3, Elevation Correlation DEr j Elevation
U* Predicted variation in item means ~;
I Stereo bypf» Ar.p.nrany
5o stereotype Correlation SAr

6« Assumed Dispersion on ar^r item '
(elevation held constant) [ Differential
\ Accuracy
7» Differential Correlation DAr j
The fact that the components are mathematically distinct does not
imply that they are necessarily uncorrelated.
Change in argr of these msy alter the Accuracy score. Surely
these aspects of social perception do not all reflect the same
trait, A person who uses the same region of the response scale
as other persons (Elevation is low) need not have superior insight.
^-^And while judging which items have the highest mean seems to
require acquaintance with the norms of the group, a person might
possess such knowledge to a very high degree and yet lack diagnos-
tic skill which would permit him to differentiate accurately
betxieen individuals. At best, f ailiire to recognize the presence
of distinct components makes interpretation ambiguous, Chowdiy
and Newcomb (6) requested group members to predict what percen-
tage of their group would agree with each of many attitude state-
ments. Ability to make this prediction was judged by a difference
score, and this score correlated significantly with le adership
status. This score, however, combines our Elevation and Stereo-
type Jlccuracy components. We cannot conclude that their leaders
are better able to judge the specific attitudes in the group.
Until the components are separately measured we cannot rule out
the possibility that leaders simply used the correct range of the
scale more often than non-leaders. This, in turn, might reflect
willingness (or unwillingness) to use extreme percentages rather
than arQT more subtle perceptiveness. That such effects do occur
is shoTrin in a stucfy \sj Lorge and Diamond, who required juiiges t^
y^
artj* r.
10
estimate what propoition of 0*s would pass ability test items. They
found that poor judges were greatly helped simply by being told the
difficulty of a few items, "apparently the difference between 'poorest
'
,
'mediocre', and 'best' judges is that the 'best* judges have some experi-
ential reference for the per cent of the population that can pass an item.
Giving such referents to the 'poorest' and 'mediocre* judges,.,leads to a
significant reorientation of such judgments," (20,p,33) When judges re-
sponded only to the items, the best judges had a mean Stereotype Correla-
tion of ,73, and the poorest one of ,56, /.fter information indicating an
appropriate reference level was given, the same groups had mean correla-
tions of ,77 and ,73« The difficulty encoiintered in inteipneling the Chow-
dry-Newcomb study does not arise in two recent treatments of the saniO
problem (18,29) where subjects are asked to predict what ranks will be
assigned to certain stimuli. The ranking method eliminates elevation and
dispersion differences from the responses, and therefore confines scores to
the Stereotype Correlation, An Alternative and more informative method
might be to analyze data of the Chowdry-Newcomb type in terms of the sepa-
rate components so as to determine how leaders behave on each. At worst,
failure to identify the ccmpcnents of the Accuracy score leads to arti-
factual correlations. Only a few of the mar^ examples in the literature
need be cited, Norman and Ainsworth (CO) report a large number of corre-
latioiis between Accuracy ("Empathy") and Assumed Similarity ("Projection"),
Since +he accuracy score contains assumed similarity components, there
would necessarily be an overlap between Those two scores even in a situa-
tion where both sets of responses are determined strictly by chance. The
correlations have no psychological meaning. In Esrmond's study (12) it was
reported that persons with high Accuracy are also most easily judged. But
a person who uses the scale in a typical manner will have a lo;>r Elevation
Component; and thus will have lower Elevation erros in judging him simply
because of this typicality. This would happen even if the other predicted
his responses mth^ut ever meeting himi Perhaps social psychologists
should take what comfort they can from Bertrand Russell's remark that
physicists "have not yet reached the point where they can distinguish
between facts about relativity and mathematical operations which may
have nothing to do thereTiith",

nAnalysis of Assumed Similarity Score into Components
Assumed Similarity (AS) may be determined (see lU, for
example) for a single Other by the formiila:
AS^ = I ( y - X f (7)JO ^ oij ji
y is the perception of by J, and x is J*s statement about
oij ji
himself, (Sometimes "ASo", Assumed Similarity between two Others
selected in a certain manner, is computed). Some investigators
have measured AS over many Others, to get a general score called
"projection" or "identification" (22),
IJe msy brealc AS into components as we did ACC, If, as before,
we measure AS by a distance formula based on sums of squares,
AS^ « i Z ? AS^ = k ( y . - X . )2
J N o 1 oij ..J .0
2
+ k , a-
:-^
. . . a
t-2 (( y -y ) - ( X -X ))
1 -IJ ••J IJ "J
+ 2 o2
i y (8)
oio
Assumed Similarity, therefore, contains four components. Equation
(8) is simpler than the corresponding formula for ACC because
some terms vanish,
Assui-ncd Elevation (AE)
The first term we may call the Assumed Elevation (AE)
component. It measures J«s tendency to assvime that Others have
the same average response as he does. This component is important
if items are polarized so that a high score on each represents
good adjustment or some other interpretable qualityj the score
then shows whether J regards the average as similar to himself
in this central dimension, tiBR^
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Assumed Dispersions (APE, API),
The second component is the Assumed Dispersion among Others in
elevation. The fourth is the Assumed Dispersion on specific items
after differences in elevation are removed. These dispersions have
already been encountered in equations (U) and (6) as components of ACC«
¥e shall refer to them as Assumed Dispersion in Elevation (ADE) and
Assumed Dispersion within Items (API), respectively.
Assumed Self-Tsrpicality (AST) >
The third component measures the discrepancy between J*s percep-
tion of the average and his self-description. This component tells
whether J regards his own profile as typical in shape. Or, we might say,
this component shows the similarity of J's self-perception to his implicit
stereotype of Others (elevation held constant). We follow Gage in calling
this Assumed SeUT-Typicality (AST) (l6, p,17).
Of the four components, only AST divides into separate variance and
correlational terms,
AST = k ( a? / a^ - 2 a a- r - ) ^^^
y .^ X. . X. . y . . X .y . .
.ij 10 10 .13 iO .10
The variance among the y's represents the tendency of the predictor to
predict different means for different items. The correlation represents
the similarity between his self-description and the average profile, after
removing differences in elevation and scatter from consideration. We may
call it the Self-Typicality Correlation (STr ),
To summarize: the components of AS are of tvio types, ADE and ADI
involve Assumed Similarity between Others ; i.e., a tendency to differ-
entiate, iJ?S and /ST represent Assumed Similarity of self to average
Other , These types seem logically distinct, but a subsequent section
will indicate the probable desirability of combining AE with ADE, and
AST with ADI.
4=
13
Optimizing Predictive Decisions
Insofar as our mathematical model is an acceptable approxi-
mation to real conditions, we can reason mathematically to de-
termine how a person may improve his judgments. We have assumed
that the goodness of predictions can be evaluated b^ the mean
2
square error. Taking the derivative of each component of ACC
,
and setting that derivative equal to zero, we find that ACC be-
comes smaller, and therefore prediction improves, xirhen
(a) J has a typical response set,
(b) c- approaches r- - a- , Here the variance is
y.io \±y.±3 \±
over items. This means that a- should not exceed
y ii
a- y and should be near zero if the Stereotype
Correlation is low. If this correlation is low,
.he
the more/differentiates among items, the poorer
is his accuracy.
(c) o approaches
^^, ,
^x«
' * ^^® variance being over
Others, This means that o ^ should not exceed a
,
,
and
y X
shoiild be near zero if the Differential Correlation is
low. This principle is true for accuracy of prediction
on any single item, and for the elevation score.
It has not been possible to determine the conditions which maxi-
mize accuracy as measured by other formulas (such as the mean of
ACC .)but a result of the same general character would be
expected.
Effects of differentiation on practical decisions
These formal principles indicate that there is an optimal
degree of differentiation in maldng judgments, jf a Jiidge cnn
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make accurate judgments as to the relative location of Others
on a continuum, then he is vdse to make a as large as a —
never larger. But if he is forced to base his judgment on
inadequate cues or if the available personality theoiy and situ-
ational knowledge do not permit trustt\rorthy inference, then he
should treat people as if they were very nearly alike. The
person who attempts to differentiate individuals on inadequate
data introduces error even when the inferences have validity
greater than chance
. This is consistent with Gage»s evidence
that judges predict a stranger more correctly when they describe
the typical person of his group than when they try to describe
him as an individual (l6, p.lO),
Tlie variation of J's predictions indicates how much he
differentiates. For example, a teacher estimating IQ's in a
class might spread them from 90 to 110, or from 70 to 130. We
would expect the judge who perceives greater differences to
spply viore sharply differentiated treatments to the persons.
His a is essentially a weighting, or an expression of his con-
fidence in his own discriminations (cf, 19, p,201), A person
who knows that the expected s,d, for IQ»s is l6 might try to
predict so that his estimates would have this s,d, but unless
he is a perfect judge, this is unwise. He will have less error
if his predicted s.d, is less than l6—how much less depending
on the correlational accuracy of his predictions.
If two diagnosticians can each judge some trait with corre-
lational validity ,i;0, the one xfho differentiates strongly (i,e*,
makes extreme statements) will mslce far more serious absolute
errors than -on© who diffeientj.ates moderately. Indeed, the
as'rtoi, e-
r.njjp-
15
person "who makes extreme differentiations on the basis of a
validity of 1^0 msgr make worse predictions, judged by absolute
magnitude of errors, than a judge who has zero correlational
validity but makes no false differentiations.
"Every pupil has his oX'jn pattern of readiness, and the
teacher must fit methods to that pattern, not treat the pupil
in terns of the statistical average" (9, p«73)« Statements such
as these, commonly made in teacher-training, now appear to require
qualification. From our evidence the degree of adaptation desirable
depends on the adequacy of the diagnostic information. If the
teacher is not well informed regarding the unique patterns of his
pupils, he should probably treat them by a standard pattern of
instruction xjhich has been carefully fitted to the typical pupil.
Modifying his plans drastically on the basis of limited diagnostic
information may do harm, A similar argument applies to clinical
diagnosis and industrial leadership. Differentiation is harmfiil
if the extent of adaption or differentiation exceeds the amount
justified by our accuracy in differentiating. This
is a distinct reversal of the view that judgment is always improved
by taldjig into account additional information which has validity
greater than zero. Investigators have noted a "central tendency
of judgment", vrhich leads to lower dispersion among estimates than
among objects, Ii/hereas formerly "the central tendency of judgment"
was regarded as a source of inaccuracy (1, p,521) our analysis
shows that this tendency may have beneficial consequences*
Teachers may properly modify treatments considerably to fit
individual differences provided they are well able to ju^dge. those
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differences* They might be expected to judge differences in
past achievement in arithmetic qiiite accurately j if so, they
could profitably provide quite different treatments (e.g., dif-
ferent assignments) for different individuals. But if it is
hard to judge some other quality (e,g», creative potential in
art), then it is a great mist alee to differentiate treatment.
Treatment from individuals should depart substantially from
that suited to the average of the group only when dependable
information is available to guide the adaptation.
Illustrative Analysis of Cornell Data
To illustrate our system of analysis, we use data kindly
provided by Bronfenbrenner and Dempsey. The data were gathered
at Cornell University primarily for the purpose of pilot analyses
such as ours. Only eight subjects and nineteen items are involved;
and we actually employ only eight of the items.
In the Cornell experiment (U)^ the eight subjects vrere can-
didates for employment as interviewers. Each person interviewed
each of the seven others. In each interview, each man was to
obtain information about his partner. Following the interview,
each person filled out a form stating his o^^m reaction and predicting
what his partner would say. There are eight items, each to be
judged on a four-point scale. One item is:
To what extent did you feel at ease during the interview?
a, very much b. a good bit c, only slightly d, not at all
The respective responses are scored 1-2-3-U, Completion of the
design provides seven self-descilpti ons and. Gcvon prerli rit.i ons by
each man (also, seven for each man).
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We have taken two simplifying steps which might be
illegitimate for purposes other than demonstration. In every
instance, we have used the average of 0*s responses over all
seven interviews as his true response, x . • This discards in-
formation on 0*s variation from interview to interview* Secondly,
we treat J*s self-description as a "prediction of himself". This
"prediction" is taken as perfectly accurate. By this device, we
deal at all times with eight Judges and eight Others, and the
criterion is made the same for every person.
Accuracy Scores for Eiglit Persons
Table 1 presents the ACC score for each person, and his score
on each component. Table 2 organizes the same data to shox/ the
person* s relative position in the group. Based as they are on
only eight cases and eight items, these data and subsequent
numerical results are illustrative, and not a proper basis for
generalization. They m^ be useful to guide future studies.
Magnitude of components
The Differential i\ccuracy Component has substantially larger
variance than the others, and therefore has much greater influence
on ACC, Although Elevation has a smaller mean than Differential
Elevation and Stereotype Accuracy, the variancesfor these three
scores are nearly equal; they pl^ an equal part in determining
individual differences in Accuracy. The correlations DEr and DAr
are generally low but positive. The Stereotype Accuracy correla^
tions, however, averaged ,7l4.
Relatior. of differentiation to accuracy
The data illustrate our mathematical principle that any
accuracy component is made smaller as the predicted standard
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deviation (a ) approaches the product of the related correlation
with the actual standard deviation {oy^m Consider, for example,
the results on Stereotype Accuracy and its constitu nts. Person 8
is an excellent Judge, according to his stereotype correlation of
«92« But he expects too much variation in the item means (.76
compared to an actual s,d« of .lili). As a consequence #8 has a
poor Stereotype Accuracy score despite his excellent ability to
discriminate between items. The best Stereotjrpe Accuracy scores
are earned by #1 and #5^ who have high correlations and who pre-
dicted variance close to the actual variance. Another comparison
worth noting involves the Differential Elevation and Differential
Elevation Correlation of #3 and //8, These persons have the same
Differential Elevation Correlation, but #3 underestimates the
variation in elevation, and #8 overestimates it. As expected,
#3 earns the better Differential Elevation score.
Reliabilities and Intercorrelations
Reliabilities of components have been determined, where
practicable, ly the Alpha formula (7), Reliability of Accuracy
over items was ,llt. This value indicates the expected consis-
tency of scores if Accuracy for each predictor were estimated
using tvxo independent sets of items. This reliability over
Others was ,37* This is the consistency expected if Differential
Elevation scores were estimated from two independent sets of
Others, The results on Differential Componentsthrow further light
on this resiilt,
LtiLfierential icciaracy was strikingly reliable over items: L «=
,73» That is to say, some predictors were consistently good
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over all items, others consistently poor« But when we exairdne
the coinponents of DA, we find that
(a) c is reliable over items ( cC « .79)
(b) DAr, the measure of accuracy in locating
others, is not ( jjC = ,18)
In this sample Differential Accurajcy shows reliability because
some persons have consistently low assumed similarity* This
makes them consistently inaccurate predictors because Differ-
ential Accuracy Correlation is generally low). No adequate
estimate could be obtained for the reliability of Elevgtion, of
Stereotype Accuracy, or of Accuracy over Others. We examined
wl^ Accuracy has reliability much lower than Differential
Accuracy, one of its components. Apparently this occurs be-
cause the sign of the stereotype error has a substantial effect
on accuracy on any one item and therefore lowers the correlation
from item to item.
Our limited data suggest the accuracy components tend to
be unreliable except where reliable differences in assumed
similarity affect the component. Stone and Leavitt (28) report
very low consistency (-.0? to 30) of accxiracy scores in pre-
dicting different children on a fairly long test, but a median
consistent of .63 between two halves of the test for the same
child. They then trace the latter consistency to consistent
favorable sets toward a given child, and to assumed similarity.
Further work is needed to establish which independent components
of Accuracy can be reliably measured.
In Table 2 we note that Number 1 is consistently superior
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on various components of accuracy and ^k is consistently
inferior. But #7, the best predictor as judged 1:^ Differential
Accuracy Corfelxticnls the poorest on Differential Elevation
CbrrcsLstion and next-to-poorest on Stereotype Aceuracy- Ccmpcnent*
Table 3 presents the intercorrelations of the eight measures of
accuracy. M asterisk indicates pairs of variates which are
experimentally linked; these correlations are higher than would
be expected from independent measurements. Being based on only
eight cases, the correlations cannot be interpreted confidently.
The correlations are low but many of them are as high as the
accorrpanying reliabilitfes.
Only one firm recommendation can presently be made.
Future studies of predictive accuracy should measure the com-
ponents separately, preferably using two independent sets of items
and Others, Such measurement mXL permit accurate determina-
tion of reliabilities, of the relation between the components,
and of their relation, if ar^r, to external criteria. Only after
such research can we decide how many important components are
present i^thin the overall Accuracy score presently used in most
research on social perception and which unwanted components must
be suppcreeBedby appropriate design of tests and scoring keys.
Illustrative Analysis of Assumed Similarity Scores
In Table I;, the Assumed Similarity scores of the eight
Judges are divided into components. Table $ presents the same
information in rank form, and Table 6 presents the intercorrela?-
tion. The relatively large variance of ADI, Assumed Dispersion
on each item, indicates that it bs© great influence on individual
.'o'f'i t-
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differences in overall Assumed Similarity,
The correlations show great overlap of Assumed Elevation
Xidth Assumed Dispersion in Elevation, and Assumed Self-Typicality
with Assumed Dispersion \d.thin Items, The tendency to differen-
tiate emcng Others is accompanied by a tendency to differentiate
the average Other from oneself. This result is partly an arti-
fact, resulting from using each person's self-description as one
of his "predictions". Even allowing for this, our correlation
suggests treating only two components of AS: Assumed Similarity
in Elevation (AE + ADE) and Assumed Similarity in Pattern (AST +
ADI), The correlation between these two variables is negligible
( X> = •21), Further evidence is required to determine how to
divide Assumed Similarity snd which components merit serious
investigation.
Correlation of Assumed Similarity with Accuracy
Table 7 gives the correlations of Assumed Similarity
components with Accuracy components.
The Judge «s "Implicit Personality Theory"
We turn now to an aspect of social perception data which
msy prove to be particularly significant, VJhen a Judge makes
predictions for a large number of Others, these predictions
define a corresponding distribution of points in the variate
space. This distribution mary be regarded as a description of
the generalized Other, representing the Judge's view of both
central tendency and individual differences. The Judge's
generalized perception may be an insertant indicator of his
expectations regarding others, lie shall discuss the general
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significance of this perceptual system before tracing its
effect on social perception scores.
J's distribution is to be examined in terms of the means
and variances on the original variates, and also in terms of the
covariances. The mean msgr be regarded as J's stereotj^e; if the
mean Other in his descriptions is "hostile", for example, this
may be highly significant. The variance indicates J*s tendency
to differentiate along a dimension; it is represented in Assumed
Dispersion within Items, The covariance is interpreted as indica-
ting the relations J expects to find among variates, A given
Judge may cijstomarily report the same persons as high on both
"quietness" and "shyness", for instance; or on both "ambition"
and " selfishness" These aspects of the distribution reveal
J»s view of others and the connotation of personality traits
for him.
We suggest that these means, variances, and covariances
describe J«s implicit theory of personality. The expectations
J has of others constitute his view of personality end presumably
direct his responses to Others, IJhile the mean of J*s predictions
might be consciously controlled to give some impression J regards
as desirable, it is quite unlikely that J is aware of the corre-
lation among his responses. For this reason, we believe that the
distribution represents J»s implicit theory of personality.
Certainly it represents associations and norms of which J is not
necessarily aware.
Osgood has drawn attention to the possibility of studying
the semantic equivalence of stimuli by testing whethex- they are
(?..!'.
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used sinilarly (21), Omt method is quite similar, determining
as it does what personality traits J regards as occurring
together, i/e propose to examine the reference frame witliin which
J locates particular others.
This concept can be illustrated "by using a small portion of
the Bronfenbrenner-Dempsey data. Their test required J to pre-
dict responses of eight persons (including himself) on these
questions
:
1» In general, how openly did you eiq)ress
your feelings and emotions during the interview?
2. How much interest did you feel in the other
lofln as a person?
3« Hoxj much were you aware of how he was feeling?
k» How much opportimity did you give him to
interview you?
5« How much important information were you able
to get about him?
6« To what extent did you feel at ease during
the interview?
7. To what extend did you succeed in establishing
a good interviewing relationship?
8, To what extent did you feel like the person
being intervievjed rather than the person doing
the interviewing?
A four-point response scale was used for these items, a low
score indicating a positive answer.
For Judge 3> a poor predictor, we determined the mean,
variance, and covariance of his predictions. The matrix of co-
variances was factored by a pivotal method akin to square-root
factor analysis (31)> intended to yield interpretable factors.
Table 8 shoxjs the loadings on three factors with item means and
'.'ij. ".:?-
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variances.
The means for Judge 3 show no striking features, especially
xrhen considered in relation to the true means presented below.
The variances indicate that 7^3 regards others as fairily uniform
in their awareness of him (item 3)^ and as varying especially in
their openness, ease, and feeling of dominance (items 1,6,8),
The first two dimensions of #3*s perceptual space crc plotted as
Figure 1, Little confidence can be placed in factors based on
eight cases, but we would otherwise interpret Factor I as repre-
senting a feeling of being under pressure. It is notable that
#3 regards those persons who are most open (item 1) as being
least at ease (item 6). Factor II shows a link between items
U and 5^ getting and giving information. Factor III is indis-
tinct. It is notable that items 6 and 7 are correlated; a "good
interviewing relation" is perceived by #3 as one wheire the inter-
viewer is at ease J Such a finding regarding #3's perception, if
better substantiated, might have much diagnostic importance.
The literature contains many studies of correlation betx-jeen
ratings which bear on the perceiver*s frame of reference. The
studies of halo effect in rating suggest the existence of a strong
general good-bad factor. These studies have not examined raters
separately, Frenkel-Brunswik reports that ethnocentric individuals
see others in black-and-white terms, the "good", "strong" traits
going together (l5> See also 25), She does not present correla-
tional data, but she is essentislly stating that halo effects
are stronger in such raters. In our language, their covariance
matrix is loaded with one factor, vrliile non-authoritarians use
'li'.'i-i.uj
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maDy factors and do jiot emphasize the general evaluative dimension,
Steiner (2?) has substantiated this conclusion, and discusses his
results in terms of the perceiver's "trait contingencies", that
is, in terms of the perceiver's frame of reference. "The indi-
vidual's assumption that certain attributes belong together is
expected to influence his percept of the person with xirhom he is
interacting" (p.3l49). Steiner 's data are restricted to group
differences, but his theory is not. Our position differs slightly
from steiner 's in that we emphasize the implicit contingencies
of which the perceiver may be quite unaware, Steiner 's method,
in its present form, requires the psrcefcier to say explicitly what
contingencies he expects.
Two other studies show differences in the perceptual ref-
erence frame of groups, Wickman's well known stucfy (30) showed
that teachers expected different traits to correlate with mental
health than did mental hygienists, Moore (21) performed a
factor analysis of ratings given non-commissioned officers by
their subordinates, and also of ratings given by their superiors.
The factor patterns differed. For instance, superiors coupled
"leadership" with eagenness and responsibility, but the sub-
ordinates viewed "leadership" as closely linkedwith intelligence
and skill.
None of these studies of groups examines the perceptual
space by which an individual describes personality, but the
evidence supports the belief that important individual differ-
ences exist. In view of our interpretation of the perceptual
distribution as an implicit personali+y theory, special interest
at-, V
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would attach to studies or ratings given by clinical psychologists
or psychiatrists of different schools, or having different amounts
of training. One objective of instruction in the field of person-
ality is to modify oversimple views students may hold. If our
procedure does reveal covert and unconscious conceptions, it may
be a usef-ul device for evaluation.
Effect on accuracy scores . The Judge's distribution of
Others has been interpreted here as a standing system of meanings
which delimts the space within which he locates Others, It is
obvious that any such delimitation would affect social perception
scores.
Discrepancies between perceived mean and actual mean lower
Stereotype Accuracy, 1/e have shown earlier that Accuracy declines
if Assumed Dispersion departs from an optimal value. The corre- •
lational effects are a bit less easy to perceive.
Correlations describe the shape of the distribution of
Others, If traits 1 and 2 are uncorrelated, then Others will
have a roughly circular bivariate distribution. If a Judge re-
gards 1 and 2 as correlated, attributing both to the same persons,
his perceived distribution will be elliptical. His perceived dis-
persion along the dimension 1+2 will be greater than in the true
responses, and his accuracy will suffer, ife can view the example
in another w^. Suppose the judge predicts variate 1 perfectly
but believes that variates 1 and 2 correlate 1,00 when they have
a true correlation of zero — - then he must have substantial
error in predicting variate 2, He can predict 2 accurately only
if he perceives the covariance of 1 xd-th 2 accurately.
,;^.^^?
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Data reported by Crow (11, p.86) show this phenomenon
clearly. As part of a larger stuc^, he asked Judges to predict
what would be the first word missed by a patient on a vocabulary
test and what was the highest level attained (called tasks Dl
and D2.) The correlation of Judges' accuracy on Dl t.jith accuracy
on 12 was positive and significant for five of ten patients, but
negative and significant on two patients. Judges tended to expect
a correlation between the two scores, and when there was a true
correlation they did well; where it was negative, the Judges
could not be accurate on both predictions. There was a rank
correlation of ,97 (over patients) between consistency of accuracy
scores, and consistency of the patient's performance.
The Cornell data were examined to determine the covariance
between items in self-descriptions. The resulting "criterion"
matrix was factored, with the results shown in Table 9 and plotted
in Figure 2 (first two factors). This pattern is different from
that of #3 (Table 8) in several respects. Notably #3 overdifferen-
tiates on all items. The first factor for #3 lumps openness and
lack of receptivenessj these variables are divided among two
factors in the criterion. In the criterion, being at ease (item 6)
is positively related to openness. It is especially interesting
that "feeling like the person being interviewed" is, for the
group as a whole, positively correlated with being at ease; but
for #3 these items are negatively correlated. With a view of
people so discrepant from the facts, it is not surprising that
#3 has a low ACC score.
hat..
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Table 9
Factors in the Criterion Covariance Matrix
Determined by Pivotal Method
I II III
Openness Receptiveness Passivity h^ Variance Mean
1 2.06
2 .lU
3 .09
k M
5 .22
6 M
7 -.10
8 -.05
Sum of
squares
5.29
Percent oi" ko%
variance
Cumulative' 1 nnf
percent
-.l|0
.9U
.1;0
.55
.60
JL§§
-.27
3.60
27^
67^'^
-.30 h.h9 I1.57 2.05
.01 .88 1.03 1.93
-.11
.9h 1.16 2.0lj
.30 l.CO 1.07 1.80
'.hh .5U .67 2.05
1.16 1.93 l.It2 1.57
.09 .76 .91 1.6U
.85 .80 2.I45 3.09
2.U6 11.35 13.3U 16.17
(siun)
18^^ 8552
85^
Recoiranendations
Studies of perception may be concerned either with constant
processes or with variable processes. When social perception is regarded
(as in Allport 1, pp. U99-5U8) as a process of interpreting the expressive
cues Other presents, or of empathizing with him, the search is clearly for
a variable process. Yet we have seen that the measures currently used
are affected by both constant and variable processes, and therefore cannot
5^prve voll to investigate either. As Crow states (11, p.57)s
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"The difficulty stems from failure to recognize
that two meanings of predictive accuracy are
involved* The use of the correlation scoring
method (either r„ „ or r„, ^, ) defines
oiyoij ^ oiy oij
predictive accuracy as the ability to approxi-
mate the actual situation, Ey the difference
score method a subject is penalized for a sys-
tematic error in estimation of the magnitude of
the actual situation, j^- the correlation method
the subject is not so penalized. Conversely, a
subject is penalized by the correlation method
if, although he has approximated the actual
situation, his predictions do not vary concomit-
antly with the actual scores. Each of these
scoring methods has its advantages and disadvan-
tages. The choice of vjhich technique to use will
depend upon the empirical relationship between the
procedures,"
An argument can be presented for concentrating attention on
constant processes, taking up variable processes only after the
constant processes are dependably measured. Constant processes
in the perceiver have potentially great importance because they
affect all his acts of perception* Individual differences in
constant processes need to be measured dependably so that their
influence can be discounted in studies of variable processes.
Moreover, identifying constant errors should permit training to
eliminate such biases; this may be the most effective way to
improve the social perception of leaders, teachers, and diagnos-
ticians.
Not all constant processes are of theoretical iinportance.
It may be that response sets in filling out a questionnaire, for
example, arise as much from the inflection of the experimenter
in reading the directions as from any personality characteristic
of the subject. It is particularly difficult to decide whether a
tendency to say "yes" on questionnaire items, or to give favorable
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answers to such questions, is a transient mental set or a reflec-
tion of one's personality (7,10), Some decision must be reached,
hoijever, in order to design measures which include or exclude
these sets as the investigator's theory dictates,
Ue may venture to suggest which components of social per-
ception measures deserve research attention, recognizing that
the ultimate importance of the components depends on whether
they relate to important criteria,
(1) To some extent, the Elevation Component reflects
^^Jhether J interprets the words defining the scale in the same
manner as others do. It appears relatively unfruitful, therefore,
as a source of information on his perception of others. It should
be separately measured or eliminated from consideration.
This is consistent vrLth Postman's view:
"In experiments concerned with the determinants
of perceptual selectivity, the contribution of verbal and
motor response habits must be specifically evaluated and
wherever possible held constant. The effects of the in-
dependent variables can then be evaluated against an
empirical baseline defined by the response habits of
the subjects,"
(2) The Assumed Similarity measures reflect a general
orientation toward others. Perhaps the tendency to differentiate
which these indices measure is a reaction shown only in the testing
situation. But the fact that significant behavioral correlates
have been found for Assumed Similarity by Cass, Fiedler, and others
(2,5,13,lii,25,26) suggests that this is a generalized mental set
influencing both test snd non-test behavior. Investigators xro\ild
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do well, hoxirever, to consider Postman's conclusion that response
dispositions can be established unambiguously only if they are
measured ty more than one "type of response. (2U, p»27)
Components related to /.ssumed Similarity include Assumed
Dispersion in Elevation, Assumed Dispersion over items, Assiuned
Elevation, and i?ss\jmed Self-Typicality. Further research is
required to determine whether these should be measured separately
or combined.
(3) Stereotype Accuracy expresses hovr closely J«s implicit
picture of the generalized Other agrees with reality. HLfferences
of this soi*t are probably important. Attention should be given
to the nature of J's errors, as well as to the overall magnitude
of the component,
(U) The Judge's Perceptual Space, studied as a whole,
includes not only information on his Stereotype and his Assumed
Dispersion, but also on the wsy in which he organizes the field
of personality. The only evidence now available on this type of
constant cognitive process is sketchy, but it suggests strongly
that this is a most important area for research,
(5) The Elevation Correlation and the Differential Accuracy-
Correlation are measures of J's senstivity to individual differ-
ences. It is these measures which will reflect his ability to
interpret expressive behavior, or his ability in differential
diagnosis. Present evidence on the reliability of measures of
this character is not encouraging, and it msy be that study of
constant processes in social perception will prove more
profitable. But those x^ho wish to study "empathy" or "social
sensitivity" as it has usually been conceptualized should reduce
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their measures to these correlational components. Stereotype
components should he eliminated (10, p,U58)«
Social perception research has been dominated by simple,
operationally defined measures. Our analysis has shown that
any such measure may combine and theret^r conceal important
variables, or msgr depend heavily on unwanted components. Only
by careful subdivision of global measures can an investigator
hope to know what he is dealing with. Our analysis makes es-
pecially clear that the investigator of social perception must
develop more explicit theory regarding the constructs he intends
to study, so that he can i^educe his measures to the genuinely
relevant components.
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